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Abstract: HPAI H5N1 is considered endemic in Indonesian poultry and poses a major 
challenge to animal and human health authorities. The complex structure of the Indonesian 
poultry meat value chain is an important reason for the limited efficacy of HPAI control 
in Indonesia so far. The paper objective is to describe how to implement a push-and-pull 
strategy in the poultry supply chain to control HPAI infection in Western Java. More 
specifically, this study investigates the poultry value chain in Western Java in relation to 
consumers’ behavior and governance of the value chain. Implementation of biosecurity 
and HPAI control measures was strongly related to the governance structure of the chain, 
with interactions that accentuating the risk of HPAI. In conclusion, a push strategy, 
as an incentive mechanism, should be designed in such a way that it pays attention to 
the interactions between actors in a value chain and their impact on introduction and 
transmission of disease. Moreover, a pull strategy as an incentive mechanism for 
consumers forcing producers to improve their production environment into higher levels 
of biosecurity is expected to be less effective than a push strategy targeting producers.
Keywords:  avian influenza, biosecurity, consumer preferences, willingness to pay, a 
push and pull strategy  
Abstrak: HPAI H5N1 saat ini sudah menjadi endemik pada komoditas unggas Indonesia 
dan memberikan tantangan yang besar terhadap otoritas kesehatan hewan dan 
manusia. Hingga saat ini, kompleksitas struktur rantai nilai pada daging unggas di 
Indonesia menjadi alasan penting yang membatasi kesuksesan pengendalian HPAI di 
Indonesia. Tujuan makalah ini adalah untuk menggambarkan bagaimana upaya untuk 
menerapkan strategi push-and-pull di dalam rantai pasokan unggas yang bertujuan untuk 
mengendalikan infeksi HPAI di Jawa Barat. Lebih khusus lagi, penelitian ini meneliti 
rantai nilai unggas di Jawa Barat terkait dengan perilaku konsumen dan tata kelola rantai 
nilai. Implementasi biosecurity dan langkah-langkah pengendalian HPAI sangat terkait 
dengan interaksi yang berisiko HPAI pada berbagai tata kelola di dalam struktur rantai 
nilai. Sebagai kesimpulan, strategi push yang digunakan sebagai mekanisme insentif 
harus dirancang dengan memperhatikan interaksi antara aktor dalam rantai nilai dan 
dampaknya terhadap introduksi dan penularan penyakit. Selain itu, strategi pull, sebagai 
mekanisme yang memberikan insentif bagi konsumen untuk memaksa produsen untuk 
meningkatkan biosekuriti yang lebih tinggi pada produksinya, ternyata kurang efektif 
daripada strategi push yang menargetkan produsen.
Kata kunci:    avian influenza, biosecurity, preferensi konsumen, WTP, strategi push and 
pull
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the first outbreak of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in Indonesia, government 
efforts to control the outbreak followed the general 
approach used in other countries as advised by FAO. 
The Indonesian government faced difficulties for a 
variety of reasons (Pramuwidyatama et al. 2018). 
One of the main reasons is the complex structure of 
the poultry supply chain (FAO, 2011). The structure 
of the poultry chain has an effect on the chain actors’ 
participation in HPAI control. The poultry supply 
chain structure can be defined as the combination of 
links and interactions between actors involved in the 
production of poultry meat. A proper understanding of 
this structure will provide a clear overview for animal 
disease control, based on the interaction in the livestock 
production and marketing channels (Rich et al. 2011). 
This includes the response of different stakeholders to 
disease outbreak, which is related to how they interact 
with different control measures (Rich and Perry, 2011). 
Therefore, without proper knowledge on the structure, 
the efficacy of proposed control strategies to manage 
HPAI H5N1 may be lower than expected. One possible 
reason why the efforts of the Indonesian government 
were not always successful may have been caused by 
the lack of clarity in defining and targeting the most 
important actors in the control of HPAI. Moreover, 
the control measures may not have been aimed at the 
proper stage of the production cycle or may not have 
addressed the interaction between different actors.
A proper understanding of the structure of a value 
chain in relation to the control of a contagious disease 
can be gained by linking a value chain analysis with a 
veterinary epidemiology and with the insight of poultry 
consumers (Indrawan et al. 2018a). The knowledge 
generated in such an approach can be contextualized 
in the structure related to the chain governance. It 
can provide important input for the development 
of government strategies for the control of HPAI. In 
this way, efforts to control HPAI will better match the 
structure of the poultry value chain and will be more 
effective.
In order to gain knowledge about the relationship 
between the value chain structure and control of 
HPAI, in this research, first, we have provided a better 
description of the Western Java value chain in relation 
to introduction and transmission of HPAI. Second we 
studied the application of biosecurity practices at the 
farm level (the micro governance level), especially in 
relation to farm business types. Third, we investigated 
the consumers’ behavior in relation to the market 
structure and their impact on HPAI control. Together, 
those aspects provide the opportunity to give a broad 
evaluation in which direction HPAI control should be 
planned to be effective. In this respect, HPAI control 
may be directed towards pushing biosecurity practices 
(a push strategy) or pulling the production by changing 
consumers’ demand (a pull strategy) or a combination 
of both approaches. 
METHODS
 
The main scientific contribution of this paper is to link 
institutional economics with veterinary epidemiology. 
Highly contagious animal diseases, such as HPAI, do 
have a huge impact on farm incomes, food security and 
a country’s economy. In many countries, with more 
complex governance structures, highly contagious 
animal diseases are endemic. Although socio-economic 
work on the control of contagious diseases has been 
carried out (e.g., Dijkhuizen et al. (1995) and King et 
al. (2007)), it was mostly done in Western countries and 
aimed at cost minimization, assuming the measures to 
be feasible. Because of the low level of compliance, 
such an approach is not useful in countries such as 
Indonesia. Measures should be evaluated for their 
efficacy, both in terms of epidemiology and in terms of 
adoption by actors in the value chain. Combining a value 
chain analysis with epidemiological knowledge was 
novel. The use of a value chain map combined with an 
in-depth assessment of governance structures through 
different typologies of transactional dynamics and 
transaction cost economics, a quantitative estimate of 
market power, and the probability of HPAI introduction 
and transmission can be added to the knowledge base on 
the interactions in the poultry structure. This approach 
differs considerably from previous HPAI studies based 
on poultry value chain (Idris et al. 2015, Loth et al. 
2011, Sudarman et al. 2010, Sumiarto and Arifin, 2008, 
Willyanto et al. 2010). 
Using this novel approach, we obtained a detailed 
understanding of the structure of the poultry sector 
and were able to untangle the complexity of control 
of HPAI in Western Java. In our analysis, we used 
the value chain as a basis for risk assessment of the 
probability of an unwanted event and its ensuing 
consequences (Costard et al. 2014). The probability of 
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quota sampling, to select respondents. The sample 
was split based on market channels, to determine 
where the respondents mainly shop for poultry meat. 
This method assures that smaller groups (in this case 
the modern channel) are adequately represented in 
the sample. The consumer study aimed at evaluating 
consumers’ behavior after HPAI outbreaks used Spiggle 
and Sewall's (1987) and Heider and Moeller's (2012) 
research framework for consumers’ choice of market 
channel. Moreover, the study added an additional 
factor to that framework, i.e. the consumers’ perceived 
risk in the situation of food unsafety (Yeung and 
Morris (2001). A discrete choice experiment was used 
to explain the Western Java consumers’ preferences for 
selected poultry meat attributes and their willingness to 
pay (WTP) for those attributes. The choice experiment 
in this study was based on Lancaster’s consumer 
theory (Lancaster, 1966) was used to design the choice 
experiment combined with the random utility theory 
(McFadden, 2001). 
We used a randomized choice-based conjoint research 
design.  Methods, and respondents for each perspective, 
and research objective of the study in Table 1. Although 
intrinsically not a methodology, this paper did take a 
novel approach to socio-economic research supporting 
decisions on disease control. It combined studies 
supporting decisions for a push strategy as well as 
studies supporting decisions for a pull strategy. Doing 
so, we can evaluate the direction of governmental 
interventions in a holistic way, being able to combine 
both push and pull approach studies. This approach 
enabled us to provide knowledge and recommendations 
to set up an effective push-and-pull strategy for animal 
disease control, as mentioned by Rich et al. (2011). 
RESULTS
The main contribution of this paper is an improved 
knowledge on how to implement a push-and-pull 
strategy in the poultry value chain; knowledge that can 
be used to design an effective strategy to control animal 
disease. The research took a value chain perspective in 
the context of chain actors’ responses to animal disease 
control. The work described in this paper was carried 
out in two goals: (i) increase knowledge on the poultry 
chain structure, and (ii) increase knowledge on a push-
and-pull strategy to control HPAI (Figure 1). The 
work was highly interdisciplinary in nature. Different 
scientific perspectives (e.g. value chain, economic 
HPAI introduction and transmission was addressed in 
relation with the relative importance of the different 
actors in the poultry value chains. Therefore, our work 
combines a farm level (micro-governance) assessment 
for biosecurity practices, complemented with novel 
knowledge of the incentive mechanisms that play a role 
in the prevention of animal diseases in the poultry value 
chain (Barnes et al. 2015, Basuno et al. 2010, Gerdoçi 
et al. 2018, Gramig and Horan, 2011, Wacker et al. 
2016). In order to combine the value chain information 
with epidemiological information, we used a qualitative 
assessment to measure risk in the context of HPAI. This 
assessment method was adapted from similar studies 
by the European Food Safety Authority (2006) and 
Kasemsuwan et al. (2009). 
The paper made use of a wide range of methodological 
approaches for collecting data (Table 1). We mapped 
the poultry value chains and assessed governance, 
economic performance of actors and epidemiological 
relationships between actors in workshops, site visits 
and in-depth interviews. These qualitative approaches 
were used, partly to overcome our limited sampling 
frame and resources, given the complexity of value 
chains. On the other hand, qualitative approaches, 
when carried out in a systematic manner, may yield a 
much better understanding of the structure of the value 
chain, especially in an exploratory phase. For instance, 
in order to fully quantify the epidemiological relations 
between actors in the value chain, many years of data 
collection and a huge number of samples taken during 
HPAI outbreaks would be required. For example, in 
the quantitative research of Indriani et al. (2010), 83 
live birds markets were sampled to establish the risk of 
avian influenza transmission from poultry to humans. 
The relatively small number of 26 semi-structured 
interviews with key informants did reveal a good 
overview of the risks for transmission and introduction. 
As a result, this study provides information on the most 
important epidemiological pathways in the poultry 
value chain and can be used to start quantitative 
epidemiological research in those pathways. Surveys 
in four important poultry production regions (Ciamis, 
Tasikmalaya, Subang and Sukabumi) were conducted 
to collect data on existing biosecurity measures. In 
order to obtain a good overview, we chose a stratified 
data collection approach. Besides questionnaires, 
on-farm measurements provided insight in available 
biosecurity measures. Surveys were also conducted 
to collect information on consumers. We also used 
the non-probability sampling method, also known as 
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Table 1. Methods, and respondents for each perspective, and research objective of the study
Perspectives Objectives Methods Respondents
Value Chain the complexity of poultry 
value chain structures and 
their influence on HPAI 
control in Western Java
• Value Chain Analysis
• Governance Structure
• Economic performance
• HPAI Risk factors
• 4 Integrated companies
• 1 Slaughter association
• 1 Integrated Slaughter house 
• 3 Semi-automated slaughterhouse
• 4 slaughter point/wet market
• 2 farmer associations (GOPAN, PINSAR)
• 1 poultry farm, 
• 1 collecting farm, 
• 2 specialty store
• 2 representatives of the banking sectors, 
• 4 government officials, 
• 1 representative of traders
• 1 representative of a traditional private 
slaughter point associations 
• 1 representative of Federation of the 
Indonesian Poultry Society (FMPI).
• 1 representative of academia
• 2 representative of consultants 
the probability of HPAI 
introduction and transmission
• Expertise-based estimation
• Qualitative Assessment
• 47 experts with knowledge:
   1) veterinary epidemiology, 
   2) the poultry value chain in Western Java 
   3) HPAI
Farms 
(Push)
micro governance of the 
farms and other factors 
influence biosecurity 
procedures on broiler farms
• Biosecurity control score
• Farm infrastructure for 
biosecurity
406 farms in four districts in the West Java 
province: Ciamis, Tasikmalaya, Subang 
and Sukabumi,
Consumers 
(Pull)
the factors that influence 
the consumers’ choice of 
poultry market channels and 
consumers’ demand after the 
HPAI outbreak
• The choice of market 
channel framework
• Multivariate logistic 
regression 
• 1,096 consumers in the Greater Jakarta
evaluate consumers' 
preferences and willingness 
to pay for poultry meat 
attributes
• Utility theory
• Discrete Choice Experiment
• Willingness to pay
• 400 consumers in the Greater Jakarta
Figure 1. Push and pull intervention in the value chain and supply chain of poultry industry
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levels and through different mechanisms. The integrator 
chain was the most coordinated chain, while the private 
slaughter point chain was the least coordinated. Each 
of the chains had a distinct main supplier based on 
FAO farm type biosecurity classification (e.g. sector 
1 farms served the integrator chain). Therefore, the 
chain governance is affecting the level of biosecurity 
on farms and in chains. Our results showed that chain 
governance is also having an effect on the economic 
consequences of HPAI incidents (Indrawan et al. 
2018a), confirming findings of previous research (Van 
Kerkhove et al. 2009, Van Steenwinkel et al. 2011, 
Yupiana et al. 2010) . The integrator chain, the most 
coordinated chain, suffers the most severe economic 
consequences of HPAI outbreaks, compared to the other 
chains. These economic consequences explain why the 
integrator chain has the highest level of biosecurity. 
Although the four defined value chains appear to 
operate in isolation, we found that the less coordinated 
chains heavily interlink between each other in the 
farming areas and the live birds markets. Typically, 
these are the two chains working with slaughter 
points. However, the semi-automated slaughterhouse 
chain also interacts with the slaughter point chains. 
These interlinkages between actors across different 
poultry value chains do contribute to the overall risks 
of transmission over the Western Java poultry sector. 
For example, while improved biosecurity in Indonesia, 
combined with a test-and-cull control policy, is still 
the government’s main strategy to control HPAI H5N1 
(Azhar et al. 2010, Dolberg et al. 2009, Ilham & Iqbal, 
2011, Loth et al. 2011, Swayne & Suarez, 2000), our 
results indicate that the incentive mechanisms present 
in most of the poultry value chains encourage a low 
level of biosecurity on poultry farms. Therefore, the 
existing chain governance is a constraint in managing 
HPAI risks. We identified four main constraints related 
to the role of chain governance in the poultry structure: 
the existence of a sick poultry market, the role of sector 
2 farming in HPAI spread, the influence of traders, 
and biosecurity practices varying across farm business 
types.
The chain governance in the two poultry value chains in 
the traditional channel allow the existence of a market 
for sick poultry. It is an important reason for the higher 
probability of HPAI introduction and transmission 
for the two chains within this channel, and plays an 
important role in financial risk mitigation for the actors 
within those chains. This is associated with the incentive 
performance, epidemiology, biosecurity and consumer 
behavior) were linked to create a knowledge framework 
for improved HPAI control.
The Knowledge on The Poultry Chain Structure
 
The structure of the Western Java poultry production 
chain is very complex. We disentangled the structure 
by looking at the value chain as well as the consumers’ 
perspective. We mapped the complexity of the value 
chain and complemented this map with insight of the 
value chain governance. The value chain analysis was 
based on a number of intensive workshops. Earlier 
published value chain analyses only looked at the 
poultry product flow (McLeod et al. 2009, Sudarman 
et al. 2010). The combination of a map of the structure 
of the poultry value chain with insight into chain 
governance as presented in this paper, provides a clear 
overview of the human interactions within the value 
chain and their expected response to HPAI outbreaks. 
Our findings show that the governance within the poultry 
value chain is an important factor driving interaction 
between actors and their response to HPAI risk. The 
value chain analysis was the base for further analyses 
linking the poultry value chain with the epidemiology 
of HPAI. We analyzed the two main aspects of the 
epidemiology of HPAI: introduction of HPAI into a 
poultry production chain and transmission of HPAI 
between actors within a poultry production chain. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis of 
its kind. We were not able to find any literature linking 
the epidemiology of a contagious notifiable disease to 
governance of an animal production chain. Regarding 
HPAI, many studies (e.g. de Glanville et al. (2010), Idris 
et al. (2015)) on HPAI epidemiology focus on contact 
structure but do not take governance into account.
We identified four poultry chains and grouped them 
based on two marketing channels: the modern and 
the traditional marketing channel. The four poultry 
chains were defined based on slaughtering activities. 
Slaughtering in the modern channel is performed 
in slaughterhouses, while in the traditional channel 
it is performed at slaughter points. Therefore, we 
named the chains according to slaughterhouse/point 
characteristics. The results demonstrate the existence of 
four different poultry value chains in Western Java: the 
integrator chain, the semi-automated slaughterhouse 
chain, the controlled slaughter point chain and the 
private slaughter point chain (Indrawan et al. 2018a). 
Each value chain operates under a different chain 
governance with coordination carried out at different 
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mechanism and penalties that may be imposed (Gramig 
et al. 2009, Williamson, 2002). Selling chickens affected 
by HPAI offers a higher financial reward than the 
government compensation for culling. Therefore, any 
poultry older than 20 days with clinical signs of disease 
will immediately be sold to this market. This discovery 
leads to the conclusion that the sick poultry market is an 
important reason for the endemicity of HPAI, because 
the test-and-cull mechanism is not applied adequately. 
The sick poultry market is not only accessed by sector 
3 and 4 farms, it is also of interest for sector 2 farms. 
Although sector 2 farms operate in the modern channel, 
they were found to be influenced by incentives from 
the sick poultry market as well. For sector 2 farms, 
the sick poultry market became a financial mitigation 
in the event of an animal disease outbreak. This does 
have an impact on their biosecurity and the increase 
of risk of HPAI introduction (Paul et al. 2012, Van den 
Berg, 2009). Besides leading to the ineffectiveness of 
test-and-cull control measures, the transport of sick 
chickens increases the risk of transmission of HPAI. 
The existence of markets for sick chickens adds to the 
complex situation of live birds markets, already known 
to be an important source of transmission of HPAI 
(Indrawan et al. 2018a, Paul et al. 2011, Van den Berg, 
2009). 
The main actor driving the sick poultry market is the 
group of traders (Indrawan et al. 2018a). The traders 
govern the controlled slaughter point chain and the 
private slaughter point chain and are therefore important 
actors in the control of HPAI. Traders established 
their influence and their critical intermediary role in 
financing transactions between farmers and poultry 
collectors, acting as brokers matching farmers and 
collectors without being physically involved. 
We found that chain governance plays a role in 
the application of biosecurity at the farm level and 
analyzed the related impact on the probability of HPAI 
introduction and transmission. The level of biosecurity 
on individual Indonesian poultry farms, important for 
reducing the risk of introduction of contagious diseases 
on a farm, has been described as low (de Glanville et al. 
2010, Indriani et al. 2010, McLeod et al. 2009). Results 
from this research support that finding. In addition, 
the level of adoption of biosecurity, both in terms of 
implemented practices as in available infrastructure, 
was found to be low at the industrial-sized farms as 
well (sector 1 and 2 farms), whereas it was previously 
suggested that biosecurity on those farms was higher. 
The biosecurity practices at the farm level did not only 
vary between farm types (sector 1 to sector 4), but 
especially between farm business types. Farm sectors 
under a company business related to the integrator chain 
were found to perform slightly better than other farm 
business types. The different incentives applied within 
these business types were the cause of the variation 
(Basuno et al. 2010, Gerdoçi et al. 2018, Wacker et 
al. 2016). There was an association between the level 
of biosecurity practices at a farm and the economic 
consequences of HPAI incidents (Van Kerkhove et al. 
2009, Van Steenwinkel et al. 2011, Yupiana et al. 2010) 
. The farms that, without any government intervention, 
would face the most severe economic consequences 
of an outbreak had the highest level of biosecurity. 
The farm business models are closely related to the 
chain governance. This means that chain governance 
also plays a role in the level of biosecurity at the farm 
level. 
In order to complete the value chain approach towards 
HPAI control, we also analyzed the Western Java poultry 
chain structure from the consumers’ perspective. The 
modern channel is considered to sell poultry meat of 
better quality, with a higher level of food safety, than 
the traditional channel. In the traditional channel, 
live bird markets are a source of HPAI transmission, 
chickens are slaughtered at slaughter points and sold 
at wet markets, which both are less hygienic. By using 
the adapted approach of Spiggle and Sewall (1987) and 
Heider and Moeller (2012), we studied the determinants 
influencing the consumers to buy from each market 
channel and found several differences (Indrawan et al. 
2018b) . Consumers purchasing poultry meat from the 
modern channel were influenced by the price/quality 
relationship (also concluded by Yu et al. 2011), the 
safety feature, and the level of consumer trust. On the 
other hand, consumers purchasing poultry meat from 
the traditional channel were influenced by freshness 
(also concluded by Chamhuri et al. (2015), Daryanto 
et al. (2014), Sujiwo et al. (2018)), place of residence 
(inside/outside Jakarta), and the amount of poultry 
meat per purchase. The findings indicate that the two 
marketing channels, the modern and traditional channel, 
serve different consumers with a different perception of 
poultry meat quality and food safety.
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To elaborate on these findings, we employed a discrete 
choice experiment to explain consumers’ preferences 
regarding features on poultry meat quality and food 
safety. We studied the Western Java consumers’ choice 
of attributes of poultry meat and their willingness to 
pay (WTP) for these attributes. The findings confirmed 
that freshness as a meat quality attribute is more 
important than food safety attributes (Goldman and 
Hino, 2005, Goldman et al. 1999, Verbeke and Viaene, 
1999) , i.e. Western Java poultry consumers use 
freshness as a synonym for quality (Chamhuri et al. 
2015) . As a consequence, consumers’ willingness to 
pay for freshness was found to be higher than for other 
poultry attributes (food safety certification and product 
information label), in both the traditional and modern 
channels. A product information label was perceived 
as positive: consumers preferred poultry meat with a 
product information label over poultry meat without a 
product information label (finding supported by work of 
Stranieri and Banterle, 2015; Verbeke and Ward, 2006). 
Furthermore, the consumers had a higher preference for 
government certification than for private certification 
(Wahida et al. 2013). 
The Knowledge on The Push-and-pull Strategy to 
Control HPAI
In order to control HPAI in Western Java, it is important 
to pay attention to the interrelations between the actors 
in the chain. These interactions affect the incentive 
mechanisms for the chain actors to improve production 
methods and to influence consumers (Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2001). Good insight in these incentive 
mechanisms are the cornerstone to effective control 
measures for HPAI. In general, two approaches can 
be taken to improve the quality of production. The 
first is to push producers to improve production and 
the second is to have consumers pulling the market 
towards better products. Control of HPAI is a quality 
aspect of poultry production, especially because of 
the link with food safety. When a government wants 
to improve the control of HPAI, it can do so within 
the current structure of the value chain. A government 
intervention will be more effective, if it is tailored to 
the structure of the value chain and the interactions 
between actors within the supply chain. When 
disease control is hampered too much by an existing 
poultry chain structure, governments may consider to 
restructure it. In the case of the Western Java poultry 
value chain, a restructured value chain would start 
with a shift of production and sales of poultry from the 
traditional channel to the modern channel. Results of 
the value chain analysis carried out in this paper, linked 
to the epidemiology of HPAI, do support the idea that a 
restructured poultry value chain in Western Java would 
improve the control of HPAI. The consumer can play 
an important role in this shift, since a shift in purchase 
behavior (from the traditional to the modern market) 
will lead to a shift in production (a pull strategy). The 
results show, however, that it is not easy to motivate 
consumers to shift from the traditional to the modern 
market. The diversity found in governance typology 
implies that there is no “one-size-fits-all” strategy for 
HPAI control (Indrawan et al. 2018a). Therefore, it 
may be recommended to combine the push and pull 
strategies. The push strategy, i.e. creating incentives for 
actors in the poultry value chain to carry out measures 
reducing the risk of introduction and transmission of 
HPAI, should be combined with measures to support 
consumers to pull the production of poultry towards 
the modern market. This research, together with other 
knowledge, provides some key insights in the incentive 
mechanisms for chain actors, including consumers, 
which can be used to design an effective push-and-pull 
strategy (Chitchumnong and Horan, 2018, Gramig et 
al. 2009, Rich and Perry, 2011). 
In order to control HPAI, a push strategy seems to 
be a quick way to improve the quality of production 
in the poultry value chain. Pushing for improved 
biosecurity, for instance by a test-and-cull approach in 
case of outbreaks on a farm, or for improved hygienic 
measures, seems relatively easy. However, the previous 
government efforts to improve biosecurity and to control 
live bird markets failed due to limited participation 
from chain actors (Azhar et al. 2010, Dolberg et al. 
2009, Ilham and Iqbal, 2011, Loth et al. 2011, Swayne 
& Suarez, 2000). Apparently, governmental efforts 
were not adapted to the existing chain governance 
and incentive mechanisms in the Western Java poultry 
sector. In the existing poultry structure, incentives 
to trade sick chickens in a sick poultry market were 
facilitated by traders not even physically involved in 
the trade of poultry (Gramig and Horan, 2011, Gramig 
et al. 2009). So, the results of any effort to increase the 
level of biosecurity or to implement other measures in 
the value chain depend on the influence of incentive 
mechanisms, including the economic consequences 
of HPAI incidents under the current chain governance 
(Van Kerkhove et al. 2009, Van Steenwinkel et al. 
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2011, Yupiana et al. 2010). Therefore, the design and 
implementation of a push strategy needs to take the role 
of current chain governance in the poultry structure into 
account. This implies that the role of the chain leader 
should be taken into account when the government 
considers any intervention. A push strategy providing 
sufficient incentives for all critical chain actors will 
be able to drive the interaction between actors to 
participate in the control measures, and will therefore 
be much more effective.
In the current situation, there are little or no incentives 
for all the actors (including the traders) to improve their 
behavior regarding HPAI. Moreover, a sick poultry 
market is in place, creating an opposite incentive in case 
of an outbreak. Therefore, HPAI is not expected to be 
controlled, especially since we found that traders, who 
have large market power and are chain leaders in two of 
the four identified value chains, were never involved in 
HPAI control measures. Any control measure aimed to 
reduce the number of chickens being traded will reduce 
the profits of traders. When a test-and-cull measure 
is combined with a compensation for the farmer, the 
trader will still have some revenues forgone and will 
not willingly collaborate. The removal of the sick 
poultry market, while creating much better incentives 
for farmers to comply to a test-and-cull measure, would 
reduce the traders’ profitability even more. When not 
collaborating with the trader, there will be no incentives 
at all for them to participate in HPAI control measures, 
rather they will use their oligopolistic power to avoid 
losing any market share. Therefore, traders will need 
to be included, with clear economic or other incentives 
to cooperate (Gramig and Horan, 2011, Gramig et al. 
2009). A similar situation regarding the sick poultry 
market applies to the interaction of sector 2 farms in 
other poultry value chains. 
In order to push for improved biosecurity at the farm 
level, the government needs to provide incentives for 
farmers in the controlled slaughter point chain and the 
private slaughter point chain. Interestingly, we found 
that a formal registration as a poultry farm business was 
associated with a higher level of biosecurity investment 
and implementation. Apparently, governmental 
incentives were created through agricultural extension 
services that deliver information and/or laboratory 
services to farmers after formal registration did provide 
an incentive for the farms. The incentives should take 
the farms’ business type into account. We expect from 
our results that taking poultry farm business types into 
account in the incentive will influence the adoption 
of biosecurity practices infrastructure (Basuno et al. 
2010, Gerdoçi et al. 2018, Wacker et al. 2016). That 
way, adjusting new incentive mechanisms according to 
the farm business type will support the government’s 
effort to control HPAI (Barnes et al. 2015, Gramig & 
Horan, 2011). 
 
Besides pushing measures to control HPAI in the 
poultry value chain, the government can also motivate 
consumers to play a role in changing the poultry value 
chain. One way to control HPAI is to pull the market 
channels towards a specific chain structure. Based on 
the consumer studies in this paper, additional insight 
can be provided in consumer behavior regarding 
poultry meat quality and food safety in relation to the 
existing market channels. Although a lot of research 
into consumers’ behavior exists regarding food safety 
(e.g. Röhr et al. (2005) and Grunert (2005)), so far only 
one paper dealt with the response of consumers to the 
HPAI outbreak (Muladno and Thieme, 2009). 
Our research shows that around 80 percent of consumers 
purchase poultry meat in the traditional channel. 
Consumers are mainly influenced by freshness as the 
key determinant factor for purchase. Moreover, the role 
of freshness as a meat quality attribute is more important 
than food safety attributes. The Western Java poultry 
consumers see warm chicken (i.e., freshly slaughtered 
chicken) as a sign of freshness, perceived as a synonym 
for quality (Chamhuri et al. 2015). Per definition, the 
freshness of warm chicken is higher than of cooled 
or frozen chicken. Thus, consumers’ willingness 
to pay for freshness was found to be higher than for 
other food attributes. Therefore, without changing the 
perception of freshness, it will be difficult to change 
the consumers’ behavior and influence their choice for 
market channel. 
Consumer perceived freshness is a key driver to 
purchase poultry on the traditional market (Chamhuri et 
al. 2015, Daryanto et al. 2014, Indrawan et al. 2018b), 
and freshness was defined related to slaughtering 
on the spot or the night before sales (Indrawan et al. 
2018b, Zhang, 2003). At the same time, this practice is 
less hygienic and carries greater risk of contamination 
and growth of pathogens. Moreover, chickens from the 
sick poultry market, providing less safe poultry meat, 
are also sold through this channel. Because of the 
clear trade-offs between freshness and food safety, a 
redefinition of freshness is required in order to promote 
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safer poultry meat. So, the success of a pull strategy 
relies on the consumers’ perception and judgment of 
the products (Chamhuri and Batt, 2015), and on their 
trust in food chain actors to provide safety in their food 
product in the market channels (Arnot et al. 2016, de 
Jonge et al. 2007, de Jonge et al. 2008, Drescher et al. 
2012), rather than on objective criteria.
In order to be able to pull changes in the value chain, 
the preference of consumers’ needs to be changed 
or overcome. The preference of consumers for 
warm chicken can be reduced by means of a pricing 
mechanism: the Western Java consumers were found 
to associate price with quality (Indrawan et al. 2018b) 
. The price difference in the modern market should be 
large enough to overcome the consumers’ willingness 
to accept meat that is perceived as less fresh. Price 
level differences can be created via subsidy or tax 
mechanisms. Another option to change the behavior of 
consumers is to promote food safety and/or a new way 
of defining freshness. Such an effort should change the 
consumers’ preference towards poultry meat quality 
and food safety. Then, the changing consumer demand 
of will pull an upgrade or an improvement of the 
production chain. 
Managerial Implications 
The current approach regarding HPAI control in 
Indonesia is limited to farms and live bird markets. It is 
aimed at preventing the spread of HPAI without looking 
at the interaction between actors in the value chain. 
As mentioned above, this approach is not effective in 
controlling HPAI sufficiently. When discussing policy 
making options, we should take into account that 
Indonesia is considered to be a low-resource country. 
For this reason, designing an intervention strategy for 
controlling HPAI in Indonesia is a difficult task and 
should be performed in such a way as to maximize the 
reduction HPAI, given the available budget, rather than 
aiming at complete eradication of HPAI.
 
Our results revealed that the main task to be undertaken 
by the government is the removal of the sick poultry 
market. The sick poultry market hampers effective 
control of HPAI in multiple ways. The first is that is 
brings an incentive for flawed behavior in case of an 
HPAI outbreak, by providing a market for chickens 
affected by HPAI. Therefore, test-and-cull measures 
are not and will not be effective, unless the payment 
for farmers will exceed the payment on the sick 
poultry market, making test and cull very expensive. 
The existence of the sick poultry market mitigates 
the financial consequences of an HPAI outbreak for 
farmers. Animals infected with HPAI still have value 
and economic incentives for improved biosecurity 
are therefore low. During transport, the probability of 
transmission of HPAI by sick chickens will be much 
higher. So the sick poultry market not only has a negative 
effect on biosecurity and a proper reaction during an 
outbreak, it even increases the HPAI problem. 
When designing and performing measures to remove 
the sick poultry market, the government should 
involve the chain actors. It is preferable if chain actors, 
especially leaders (i.e., traders) join the government's 
efforts voluntarily, eventually encouraged by incentive 
mechanisms. A part of the available budget might be 
dedicated to incentives. The main attention of pushing 
a removal of the sick poultry market should be aimed 
at the traditional channel. The strategy should engage 
the traders (who were left out from previous control 
programs) by paying attention to their incentives to 
preserve the sick poultry market. A potential direction 
to provide the traders with an incentive to join efforts to 
remove the sick poultry market is to upgrade their role 
from informal to formal commercial agents, similar to 
financial institutions or collecting farms (Indrawan et 
al. 2018a). As formal commercial agents, the traders 
will become more involved to stimulate efficient and 
effective poultry meat production. The coordination 
between the traders and farmers, collecting farms, and 
transporters is expected to change from on-the-spot 
transactions to contractual, long-term agreements, thus 
improving coordination in the controlled slaughter 
point chain as well as in the private slaughter point 
chain. A pull approach towards a removal of the sick 
poultry market might take the form of an advertisement 
campaign, making consumers aware that a part of the 
poultry they buy is sick.
As described before, all Western Java poultry farms 
could improve their biosecurity considerably. A removal 
of the sick poultry market may modify the incentives 
for biosecurity improvement, but besides that, 
additional initiatives should be taken to push poultry 
farmers (including sector 1 farms) towards improved 
biosecurity. As proposed in the previous paragraph, 
improving chain coordination in the slaughter point 
chain and the private slaughter point chain also helps 
to bring incentives to poultry farmers for biosecurity 
improvement. Generally, when looking at incentives for 
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farmers for biosecurity improvement, the farm business 
type should be taken into account. Moreover, proper 
cost-benefit analyses of improved biosecurity need to be 
made. A positive aspect of biosecurity is that it does not 
only reduce the risk of introduction and transmission of 
HPAI, but also of other, contagious, poultry diseases. 
So, the benefits of improved biosecurity are bigger 
than just a reduction in the damage of HPAI. A final 
issue regarding measures to push the production into 
a specific direction is the enforcement of regulations. 
When implementing novel regulations, they should be 
designed in such a way that they are easily enforced. 
When moving beyond voluntary changes in behavior, 
regulation enforcement is crucial.
A pull strategy, as the other possible direction of 
government intervention, will focus on consumers. It 
should create incentives to shift the consumers away 
from buying poultry meat in the traditional channel. 
A classical method to move consumers in a preferred 
direction is the adoption of economic incentives. By 
differentiating taxes and/or subsidies between the two 
channels, consumers' preferences may shift towards 
another channel. Another method to change consumers' 
preferences is to run campaigns, such as education and 
advertisement of healthy poultry meat. Changing taxes 
and/or subsidies, the government influences the price/
quality relationship for poultry meat. For instance, by 
subsidizing the modern channel, the consumers may 
buy more poultry meat from this channel. On the other 
hand, by additional or increased taxes in the traditional 
channel, the consumers may buy less in this channel. 
In order to do so, a proper tax or subsidy system should 
be implemented and, for subsidies to be effective, the 
market should function properly. If a tax or a subsidy 
has no visible effect on the consumer price, it will not 
be effective. 
Financial incentives may be combined with health 
campaigns to change the consumers' preference towards 
the modern market. With what we have learned in our 
work, we now know that such campaigns should be 
aimed at reducing the trade-off between food safety 
and freshness, meaning that the government should 
either communicate a redefinition of freshness, or 
the importance of safe chicken, or both. In order for 
the level of food safety to be trustworthy, campaigns 
should be combined with food safety certification. By 
supporting the promotion of freshness and food safety 
features of poultry meat at the modern channel with 
financial incentives, Western Java consumers might 
very well start to prefer the modern channel, increasing 
the probability of pulling the poultry supply chain to a 
safer production. As a side note, we expect that a pull 
strategy is implemented for the long run, as it will not 
be effective in the short run. To make progress in the 
short run, the focus should be on the push strategy. 
Because of the cost involved with the above measures, 
the evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of single or 
combinations of measures can be linked to the available 
(long term) budgets, so that the most cost-effective 
measure can be implemented. Distribution of costs and 
benefits over actors in the value chain (including the 
government) should be taken into account. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
First, poultry production in Western Java is organized in 
a highly complex structure. Four different value chains 
can be distinguished: the integrator chain, the semi-
automated slaughter chain, the controlled slaughter 
point chain, and the private slaughter point chain. This 
complex structure is responsible for the existence of a 
market for sick poultry that has a very negative influence 
on HPAI control. Traders need to be involved in the 
design and implementation of HPAI control measures, 
since they are the informal chain leaders in the controlled 
slaughter point and the private slaughter point chains. 
A combination of a value chain analysis with expertise-
based estimates for HPAI introduction and transmission 
did identify critical actors in the epidemiology of HPAI. 
The method can easily be applied to study the structure 
of endemic contagious disease problems in developing 
countries having inadequate resources for extensive 
epidemiological research. Second, as we found that 
BCS and FIB were determined by the farm business 
types, limited biosecurity practices and infrastructure 
were demonstrated for all farm business types. 
Traffic control practices and facilities were the lowest 
biosecurity performance. A makloon contract farm 
was found as the lowest performance of biosecurity 
practices and facilities than other business types. 
Third, the main reason for consumers in Western Java to 
have a preference for the less safe, wet poultry markets, 
is their perception of freshness. Our study revealed that 
the main task to be undertaken by the government is the 
removal of the sick poultry market. The main attention 
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chain actors, their transaction costs, and the costs of 
their efforts to control HPAI, and relating that to the 
benefits of a reduced risk of HPAI as well as of other 
contagious diseases. Simulation modeling is a good basis 
for utility-driven cost-benefit evaluation. For instance, 
the economic effects of the removal of the sick poultry 
market should be evaluated for all actors involved. In a 
next step, the economic effects of a proposed measure 
should be studied in combination with other (tangible 
and intangible) factors that motivate actors to behave 
in a certain way. These studies can be based on social-
psychological theory, such as the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), which has been used in other 
food safety research, including Verbeke and Viaene 
(1999), Verbeke and Vackier (2005), Lobb et al. (2007), 
and Mazzocchi et al. (2008).
To understand the interaction of actors within the 
different value chains, and to quantify these interactions, 
a Principal Agent approach (Laffont and Martimort, 
2009) can be taken. In this approach, the (economic) 
dependencies of actors within a chain can be quantified. 
Principal Agent Theory has been used before in the 
animal production domain, for instance by King et al. 
(2007), who developed an incentive system for food 
quality control for Salmonella, by Resende-Filho and 
Buhr (2008), who evaluated the economic value of a 
traceability system, and by (Yunxian et al. 2010), who 
studied retailers' order contracts in a perishable product 
value chain.
In order to evaluate the overall effect of implementing 
incentives for the full value chain, the insights of 
intangible incentives for individual actors should be 
taken into account. An evaluation can be based on 
game theory (e.g., Delabouglise and Boni (2018) and 
Manfredi and D'Onofrio (2013)). Although there are no 
known examples of applying game theory in the control 
of animal diseases, some work on epidemiological 
game-theoretic models have been published for control 
of disease in humans, for instance to control influenza 
(Galvani et al. 2007). Another full value chain approach 
can be to combine epidemiological knowledge with 
behavioral knowledge in an agent-based model, as 
recently for Bluetongue virus in the Netherlands (Sok & 
Fischer, 2018). In these modeling approaches, different 
types of incentive systems influencing poultry actors’ 
decisions and consequences in the occurrence of HPAI 
can be simulated. The effects of incentive systems 
for farmers and traders can be studied separately, or 
in combination to find interactions between these 
of pushing a removal of the sick poultry market should 
be aimed at the traditional channel. The strategy 
should engage the traders (who were left out from 
previous control programs) by paying attention to their 
incentives to preserve the sick poultry market. A final 
issue regarding measures to push the production into 
a specific direction is the enforcement of regulations. 
When implementing novel regulations, they should be 
designed in such a way that they are easily enforced. 
When moving beyond voluntary changes in behavior, 
regulation enforcement is crucial. 
Recommendations
A pull strategy, as the other possible direction of 
government intervention, will focus on consumers. A 
pull approach towards a removal of the sick poultry 
market might take the form of an advertisement 
campaign, making consumers aware that a part of the 
poultry they buy is sick. It should create incentives to 
shift the consumers away from buying poultry meat 
in the traditional channel. A classical method to move 
consumers in a preferred direction is the adoption of 
economic incentives. As a side note, we expect that a 
pull strategy is implemented for the long run, as it will 
not be effective in the short run. To make progress in 
the short run, the focus should be on the push strategy. 
In our work, we have generated an extensive body of 
knowledge that can is valuable for the design of future 
control measures for HPAI in Indonesia. However, some 
aspects remain unclear. We have mainly worked towards 
a better understanding of the poultry chain structure 
and were able to make conclusions on general incentive 
mechanisms. However, we did not study specific push 
or pull incentives nor how these incentives might 
affect the actors' motivation to change their behavior. 
For instance, we were only able to identify generic 
incentives for traders to become commercial agents, or 
incentives for farmers to implement better biosecurity 
measures. We did not study any specific measures. 
Given the expected effectiveness (also in time), future 
research should focus on the implementation of specific 
push strategies by the government, rather than on pull 
strategies. 
First, it is essential to help plan, implement and evaluate 
incentive mechanisms for the chain actors in the poultry 
chain structure. In a first step, based on utility theory, the 
economic impact of proposed measures on the involved 
actors should be studied, exploring the relation between 
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